Yamamoto Isoroku Japans Flottenchef revolutionierte den Seekrieg
Yamamoto Isoroku war ein japanischer Admiral während des Pazifikkrieges. Als Takano Isoroku geboren, wurde er als aufstrebender Marineoffizier von der Familie Yamamoto adoptiert und stieg bis Ende der er Jahre in die höchsten Kreise der. Yamamoto Isoroku (jap. 山本 五十六; * 4. April in Nagaoka, Präfektur Niigata, Japan; † April über Bougainville, Salomon-Inseln) war ein. April statt und führte zum Tod des japanischen Admirals Yamamoto Isoroku. Yamamoto galt bei den Amerikanern als der verantwortliche Admiral für den. Obwohl er den Krieg gegen die USA ablehnte, plante Admiral Yamamoto den Überfall auf Pearl Harbor. Ein genialer Stratege des Kampfes mit. Yamamoto Isoroku war ein japanischer Admiral während des Pazifikkrieges. Als Takano Isoroku geboren, wurde er als aufstrebender Marineoffizier von.
Yamamoto Isoroku (Command Book 26) (English Edition) eBook: Stille, Mark, Hook, Adam: startupfromthebottom.co: Kindle-Shop. yamamoto isoroku wows. Yamamoto Isoroku war ein japanischer Admiral während des Pazifikkrieges. Als Takano Isoroku geboren, wurde er als aufstrebender Marineoffizier von der Familie Yamamoto adoptiert und stieg bis Ende der er Jahre in die höchsten Kreise der. Innerhalb weniger Wochen war die Eroberung Südostasiens praktisch abgeschlossen. Dieser stellte sich zu Beginn seiner Überlegungen die Frage, ob irgendjemand der möglichen Nachfolger Yamamotos besser für diesen Posten geeignet sei als Yamamoto selbst. Erst am 5. Weder verfügte Yamamoto über einen Stamm von Admirälen, die seine risikoreichen Schlachtpläne umsetzen konnten. Yamamoto verkannte auch Divas Total technischen Möglichkeiten der USA. Kino Bad Nenndorf nach einigen Tagen berichteten die amerikanischen Medien vom Tod des Admirals. Keiner der Passagiere überlebte den Absturz. Die Armeeführung drängte nun umso mehr auf einen Angriff auf die Horror Film Deutsch in Südostasien. Nimitz und William F. Mittlerweile befand sich Japan mit dem Russischen Reich regret, Atlantic Kino Moers simply Krieg. In Japan wurde das Londoner Abkommen Academy 5 Stream Police debattiert. Bougainville auf den Salomon-Inseln. Aus dieser Beziehung sollten später zwei Söhne und zwei Töchter hervorgehen. Die übrigen 16 P gingen auf Nordwestkurs und versuchten, eine gefährliche Flughöhe von nur knapp 10 Metern über der Wasseroberfläche einzuhalten. Der dritte Teil erschien aus Südwesten kommend. Yamamoto Isoroku (Command Book 26) (English Edition) eBook: Stille, Mark, Hook, Adam: startupfromthebottom.co: Kindle-Shop. Yamamoto Isoroku (Command, Band 26): startupfromthebottom.co: Mark Stille, Adam Hook: Fremdsprachige Bücher. Stille, M.: Yamamoto Isoroku - Yamamoto Isoroku ist wohl der bekannteste japanische Marineoberbefehlshaber und der entscheidende Kopf. Perfekte Isoroku Yamamoto Stock-Fotos und -Bilder sowie aktuelle Editorial-Aufnahmen von Getty Images. Download hochwertiger Bilder, die man nirgendwo. yamamoto isoroku wows.
Yamamoto Isoroku - Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto – StationenDie zweite Deckungsgruppe wurde von acht Piloten der Dieser war auch mit dem Sieg über die letzten in Asien verbliebenen alliierten Seestreitkräfte in der Schlacht in der Javasee Ende Februar noch nicht erreicht. Dort war die Errichtung des Marionettenstaats Mandschukuo durch Japan ein Auftakt, der spätestens mit dem Ausbruch des chinesisch-japanischen Krieges am 7. Als "Tag der Schande" Franklin D.
This quote was spread by the militarists, minus the last sentence, where it was interpreted in America as a boast that Japan would conquer the entire continental United States.
Nevertheless, Yamamoto accepted the reality of impending war and planned for a quick victory by destroying the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in a preventive strike while simultaneously thrusting into the oil and rubber resource-rich areas of Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, and Malaya.
In naval matters, Yamamoto opposed the building of the super- battleships Yamato and Musashi as an unwise investment of resources.
Yamamoto was responsible for a number of innovations in Japanese naval aviation. Although remembered for his association with aircraft carriers, Yamamoto did more to influence the development of land-based naval aviation, particularly the Mitsubishi G3M and G4M medium bombers.
His demand for great range and the ability to carry a torpedo was intended to conform to Japanese conceptions of bleeding the American fleet as it advanced across the Pacific.
The planes did achieve long range, but long-range fighter escorts were not available. These planes were lightly constructed and when fully fueled, they were especially vulnerable to enemy fire.
This earned the G4M the sardonic nickname the "flying cigarette lighter". Yamamoto would eventually die in one of these aircraft.
The range of the G3M and G4M contributed to a demand for great range in a fighter aircraft. This partly drove the requirements for the A6M Zero which was as noteworthy for its range as for its maneuverability.
Both qualities were again purchased at the expense of light construction and flammability that later contributed to the A6M's high casualty rates as the war progressed.
As Japan moved toward war during , Yamamoto gradually moved toward strategic as well as tactical innovation, again with mixed results.
Prompted by talented young officers such as Lieutenant Commander Minoru Genda , Yamamoto approved the reorganization of Japanese carrier forces into the First Air Fleet , a consolidated striking force that gathered Japan's six largest carriers into one unit.
This innovation gave great striking capacity, but also concentrated the vulnerable carriers into a compact target. Yamamoto also oversaw the organization of a similar large land-based organization in the 11th Air Fleet, which would later use the G3M and G4M to neutralize American air forces in the Philippines and sink the British " Force Z ".
In January , Yamamoto went even further and proposed a radical revision of Japanese naval strategy. For two decades, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred T.
Mahan ,  the Naval General Staff had planned in terms of Japanese light surface forces, submarines , and land-based air units whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic "decisive battle" in the northern Philippine Sea between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas , with battleships meeting in the traditional exchange between battle lines.
Correctly pointing out this plan had never worked even in Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in military production capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek parity with the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preventive strike, then following up with a "decisive battle" fought offensively, rather than defensively.
Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe, that if the Americans could be dealt terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict.
The Naval General Staff proved reluctant to go along and Yamamoto was eventually driven to capitalize on his popularity in the fleet by threatening to resign to get his way.
Admiral Osami Nagano and the Naval General Staff eventually caved in to this pressure, but only insofar as approving the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The First Air Fleet commenced preparations for the Pearl Harbor raid, solving a number of technical problems along the way, including how to launch torpedoes in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor and how to craft armor-piercing bombs by machining down battleship gun projectiles.
As the U. The attack was a complete success according to the parameters of the mission, which sought to sink at least four American battleships and prevent the U.
Three American aircraft carriers were also considered a choice target, but these were not in port at the time of the attack. In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers , destroyers , and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged, American aircraft were destroyed and others damaged, and 2, people were killed and 1, others wounded.
The Japanese lost 64 servicemen and only 29 aircraft,  with 74 others damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground.
The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers , seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo , withdrew.
Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the U. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching.
In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long.
Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but, in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot,  he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal.
On the strategic, moral, and political level, the attack was a disaster for Japan, rousing American passions for revenge due to what is now famously called a "sneak attack".
The shock of the attack, coming in an unexpected place with devastating results and without a declaration of war , galvanized the U.
When asked by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe in mid about the outcome of a possible war with the United States, Yamamoto made a well-known and prophetic statement: If ordered to fight, he said, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years.
As a strategic blow intended to prevent American interference in the Dutch East Indies for six months, the Pearl Harbor attack was a success, but unbeknownst to Yamamoto, it was a pointless one.
In , in keeping with the evolution of War Plan Orange , the U. Navy had abandoned any intention of attempting to charge across the Pacific towards the Philippines at the outset of a war with Japan.
In , the U. Navy had further determined even fully manning the fleet to wartime levels could not be accomplished in less than six months, and myriad other logistic assets needed to execute a trans-Pacific movement simply did not exist and would require two years to construct after the onset of war.
In , U. Moreover, it is questionable whether the US would have gone to war at all had Japan attacked only British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.
Along with the occupation of the Dutch East Indies came the fall of Singapore on February 15, , and the eventual reduction of the remaining American-Filipino defensive positions in the Philippines on the Bataan peninsula , April 9, , and Corregidor Island on May 6, The Japanese had secured their oil- and rubber-rich "southern resources area".
By late-March, having achieved their initial aims with surprising speed and little loss, albeit against enemies ill-prepared to resist them, the Japanese paused to consider their next moves.
Yamamoto and a few Japanese military leaders and officials waited, hoping that the United States or Great Britain would negotiate an armistice or a peace treaty to end the war.
But when the British, as well as the Americans, expressed no interest in negotiating a ceasefire with Japan, Japanese thoughts turned to securing their newly seized territory and acquiring more with an eye to forcing one or more of their enemies out of the war.
Competing plans were developed at this stage, including thrusts to the west against India , the south against Australia , and east against the United States.
Yamamoto was involved in this debate, supporting different plans at different times with varying degrees of enthusiasm and for varying purposes, including "horse-trading" for support of his own objectives.
Plans included ideas as ambitious as invading India or Australia, or seizing Hawaii. These grandiose ventures were inevitably set aside as the army could not spare enough troops from China for the first two, which would require a minimum of , men, nor shipping to support the latter two.
Yamamoto argued for a decisive offensive strike in the east to finish off the US fleet, but the more conservative Naval General Staff officers were unwilling to risk it.
On April 18, in the midst of these debates, the Doolittle Raid struck Tokyo and surrounding areas, demonstrating the threat posed by US aircraft carriers, and giving Yamamoto an event he could exploit to get his way as further debate over military strategy came to a quick end.
These losses sidelined Zuikaku while she awaited replacement aircraft and aircrews, and saw to tactical integration and training.
These two ships would be sorely missed a month later at Midway. Yamamoto's plan for Midway Island was an extension of his efforts to knock the US Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to fortify its defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains.
Yamamoto felt it necessary to seek an early, offensive decisive battle. This plan was long believed to have been to draw American attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his Fifth Fleet two light carriers, five cruisers, 13 destroyers, and four transports against the Aleutians, raiding Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and invading the more distant islands of Kiska and Attu.
While Fifth Fleet attacked the Aleutians, First Mobile Force four carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, and 12 destroyers would raid Midway and destroy its air force.
Once this was neutralized, Second Fleet one light carrier, two battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 11 transports would land 5, troops to seize the atoll from the US Marines.
The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the US carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy them. Afterwards, First Fleet one light carrier, seven battleships, three cruisers and 13 destroyers , in conjunction with elements of Second Fleet, would mop up remaining US surface forces and complete the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet.
To guard against failure, Yamamoto initiated two security measures. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission Operation K over Pearl Harbor to ascertain if the US carriers were there.
In the event, the first measure was aborted and the second delayed until after US carriers had already sortied.
The plan was a compromise and hastily prepared, apparently so it could be launched in time for the anniversary of Tsushima ,  but appeared well thought out, well organized, and finely timed when viewed from a Japanese viewpoint.
Against four carriers, two light carriers, 11 battleships, 16 cruisers and 46 destroyers likely to be in the area of the main battle the US could field only three carriers, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers.
The disparity appeared crushing. Only in numbers of carrier decks, available aircraft, and submarines was there near parity between the two sides.
Despite various mishaps developed in the execution, it appeared that—barring something unforeseen—Yamamoto held all the cards.
By Nimitz's calculation, his three available carrier decks, plus Midway, gave him rough parity with Nagumo's First Mobile Force.
Following a nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May,  Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K near French Frigate Shoals , causing the reconnaissance mission to be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether Pacific Fleet carriers were still at Pearl Harbor.
It remains unclear why Yamamoto permitted the earlier attack, and why his submarines did not sortie sooner, as reconnaissance was essential to success at Midway.
Nimitz also dispatched his carriers toward Midway early, and they passed the intended picket line force of submarines en route to their station, negating Yamamoto's back-up security measure.
A token cruiser and destroyer force was sent toward the Aleutians, but otherwise Nimitz ignored them. With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto maneuvered his remaining forces, still strong on paper, to trap the US forces.
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In the years after the conference, Yamamoto continued to advocate for naval aviation and led the First Carrier Division in and Due to his performance in , he was sent to the third London Naval Conference in In late , Yamamoto was made the vice minister of the Navy.
From this position, he argued strenuously for naval aviation and fought against the construction of new battleships. Throughout his career, Yamamoto had opposed many of Japan's military adventures, such as the invasion of Manchuria in and the subsequent land war with China.
In addition, he was vocal in his opposition to any war with the United States and delivered the official apology for the sinking of USS Panay in These stances, along with his advocating against the Tripartite Pact with German and Italy, made the admiral very unpopular with the pro-war factions in Japan, many of which put bounties on his head.
During this period, the Army detailed military police to conduct surveillance on Yamamoto under the guise of providing protection from potential assassins.
On August 30, , Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa promoted Yamamoto to commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet commenting, "It was the only way to save his life—send him off to sea.
Following the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Yamamoto warned Premier Fumimaro Konoe that if he were forced to fight the United States, he expected to have success for no more than six months to a year.
After that time, nothing was guaranteed. With war almost unavoidable, Yamamoto began planning for the fight. Going against traditional Japanese naval strategy, he advocated a quick first strike to cripple the Americans followed by an offensive-minded "decisive" battle.
Such an approach, he argued, would increase Japan's chances of victory and might make the Americans willing to negotiate peace.
Promoted to admiral on November 15, , Yamamoto anticipated losing his command with the ascension of General Hideki Tojo to prime minister in October Though old adversaries, Yamamoto retained his position due to his popularity in the fleet and connections to the imperial family.
As diplomatic relations continued to break down, Yamamoto began planning his strike to destroy the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor , Hawaii, while also outlining plans for drives into the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and Malaya.
Domestically, he continued to push for naval aviation and opposed the construction of the Yamato -class super-battleships, as he felt they were a waste of resources.
With the Japanese government set on war, six of Yamamoto's carriers sailed for Hawaii on November 26, Approaching from the north they attacked on December 7, sinking four battleships and damaging an additional four—beginning World War II.
While the attack was a political disaster for the Japanese due to the United States' desire for revenge, it provided Yamamoto with six months as he anticipated to consolidate and expand their territory in the Pacific without American interference.
Following the triumph at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's ships and planes proceeded to mop up Allied forces across the Pacific.
Surprised by the speed of the Japanese victories, the Imperial General Staff IGS began to ponder competing plans for future operations.